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ment was indispensable. As to the necessity for consent, it is not entirely clear
from the opinion whether the Court proceeded on the theory that the contract
involved personal services, the hiring of Bass as a booking agent, or that the
contract conveying dramatic rights was of such a character that it was nonassignable without the consent of the original owner.8 The fact that Bass did
nothing to secure lecture engagements and thereby breached his managerial
obligations is available not only to Nijinsky but also to the plaintiff and affords
another ground for giving priority to plaintiff's claimP
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL PAITNERSHp AGREEMENT

It is settled law in New York State that as between the statutory partnership laws and a partnership agreement, the latter is controlling.10 From this
it follows that unless a partnership agreement establishes a different relationship between the partners, a partner, upon dissolution of a partnership, is
entitled to what he would have received on dissolution under the Partnership
Laws.":
The Court of Appeals in Jackson v. Hunt, Hill and Betts,'2 construed a
partnership agreement. It held that the plaintiff, who withdrew from a law
firm located in New York City, was entitled not only to his share of the fees
paid to the firm prior to the date of withdrawal, but also to all fees earned
but unpaid, whether billed or unbilled, on the date of his withdrawal. This
decision reversed a judgment of the Appellate Division,' 3 dismissing plaintiff's
amended complaint. The Appellate Division had reversed an interlocutory
judgment entered upon a decision: by tie Supreme Court, 14 ordering an accounting in favor of plaintiff.
The decision of the court revolved around'whether the term "Net profits"
as used in the partnership agreement included fees that were earned but -uncollected, or only such as were already collected by the firm at the time when
the partner withdrew.
The Court relied on the meaning the partnership agreement intended in
using the term "net profits." This term was defined as "net fees" less 10o
allocated to the capital account. "Net fees" in turn was defined under Article Ill of the agreement as the balance remaining after expenses of the firm
incurred for that year were subtracted from the gross fees earned by the firm
for that year. This indicated to the court that "net fees" were determined on
8. Ibid.
9. Israel v. Wood DoLson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
10. In re Eddy, 290 N.Y. 677, 49 N.E.2d 628 (1943); Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y.
32, 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939); Hermes v. Compton, 260 App. Div. 507, 23 N.Y.S.2d 126
(2d Dep't 1940).
11. N.Y. Partnership Law ch. 39, § 1 et seq.
12. 7 N.Y.2d 180, 196 N.YS.2d 647 (1959).
13. 4 A.D.2d 414, 187 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1st Dep't 1959).
14. 12 Misc. 2d 797, 177 N.YS.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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the basis of what the firm earned, not merely on what was collected in any
particular year.
The term "net profits" was employed in another context in the agreement.
The partnership agreement established what it labelled a "Participation Schedule." Net profits of the Arm uncollected during any one year were to be distributed in accordance with this schedule in the year such fees were paid.
However the section referring to this "Participation Schedule" expressly applied
only to those members remaining with the firm, and excluded withdrawing
partners. This would seem to divest plaintiff of his interest in the uncollected
fees, except for a savings clause in the case of withdrawing partners contained
in Article IV of the agreement. This clause provided that in the case of -a
withdrawal of a partner, a prompt estimate be made of the "net profits" of
the firm on the date of withdrawal. The Court pointed out that if the term
"net profits" was meant to include only cash on hand, there would have been
no need of an estimate, for an exact computation would have sufficed.
The Court excluded respondent's argument that "net profits" meant only
cash net profits on hand as of the date of a withdrawal of a partner. If this
argument was sustained, the section containing the Participation Schedule
would have been meaningless.
Other partners in the law firm who retired at the same time as plaintiff
were not deprived of participating in unbilled or uncollected fees of the law
firm. The Court saw no apparent reason to treat plaintiff any differently.
CONTRAcTS or INsURAN cE CONSTrUED AGANST THE INSURER

The problem presented by Sperling. v. Great American Indemnity Company involves the interpretation of insurance contracts. 15 The insured's 16 year
old daughter stole an automobile, with which she negligently injured.the decedent. The daughter was covered by a "Family Automobile Policy'" in her
mother's name, issued by the defendant.
The pertinent parts of the policy in question stated:.
(A) "With respect to the owned automobile . . . provided the actual
use thereof is with the permission of the named insured."
(B) "With respect to a non-owned automobile ... any relative, but
only with respect to a private passenger automobile
or trailer
'
not regularly furnished for the use of such relative."lsa
Plaintiff sued the insured in a wrongful death action which the defendant
refused to defend, or to pay the judgment. Plaintiff then sued. the defendant
and was awarded a summary judgment,' 6 from which this appeal was taken.
The defendant claimed that the policy implies that in order for it to be
liable the car must have been "furnished," and that since the accident occurred
15. 7 N.Y.2d 442, 199 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1960).
15a. Id. at 446, 199 N.Y.S2d 468.
16. 8 A.D.2d 986, 191 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1st Dep't 1959).

121

